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The paper analyses the impact of the reach of communist parties, the degree of political 
activism, personal attributes of workers, and industrial characteristics on the individual 
decision to unionise for Indian non-agricultural regular workers using micro data from the 
2004-05 Employment and Unemployment Survey, NSSO, linked to state-level factors. A 
notable result is that the reach of communist parties has considerable effect on unionisation 
probability. Moreover, it seems that mere existence of communist parties in a state also 
facilitates unionisation to some extent. State-level political activism and unemployment rate 
also influence the individual decision to be unionist. The paper concludes also that worker’s 
gender, marital status, ethnic background, employment status, experience, occupation, sector 
of employment, establishment size, and type of industry remain important in the 
determination of union membership. 
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This paper analyses the determinants of individual decision to unionise for non-agricultural 
regular workers in India. We are primarily interested in answering two questions: Do the 
reach of communist parties and the degree of state-level political activism affect individual 
decision to unionise? What are the characteristics of the individuals who join trade unions?  
 
Both the microeconomic theory and the empirical literature on union membership decision 
have been enriched by many studies in recent years. It helps us to understand a range of 
important issues such as partial union coverage (Bulkley and Myles, 2001), role of social 
customs on formation of trade unions (Naylor, 1989; Booth, 1985), role of product market 
competition (Moreton, 1998), effect of globalization (Dreher and Gaston, 2007; Martin and 
Brady, 2007), impact of personal attributes and job characteristics on individual decision 
(Bryson and Gomez, 2005; Arulampalam and Booth, 2000; Green, 1990; Booth 1986 to name 
a few), etc.. However, existing empirical studies of individual union status have primarily 
focused on developed countries. Little is known about trade union memberships in 
developing countries like India. In addition, existing studies have not attempted to estimate 
the impact of political factors at sub-national level, which assess the context of unionisation, 
on individual decision to unionise, despite the fact that the interconnection between trade 
unions and political factors has long been recognised. In a society with more politically active 
population, workers are likely to be more inclined towards trade unions, compared to that in a 
less politically active society. Ideology of political parties also plays crucial role in 
facilitating unionisation. Traditionally, communist parties have encouraged class-
consciousness in societies and in turn, facilitated collective organisations. High level of 
political activism and/or support base of communist parties might also lead to high social cost 
of abstaining from trade union. Therefore, it is important to consider the effects of political 
factors like the reach of communist parties and the degree of political activism while 
analysing the determinants of individual decision to unionise.  
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This paper aims to consider the role of the reach of communist parties, the degree of political 
activism, personal attributes of workers and industrial characteristics on union membership 
decision, using  micro-data set provided by the 2004-05 Employment and Unemployment 
Survey (EUS), which is a nationally representative survey conducted by NSSO,  India, and 
state-level data on political and institutional factors. Wide variations across states in India in 
terms of political activism, reach of communist parties, labour market situation, and also 
union density draws special attention to analyse the impact of communist parties and political 
activism at sub-national level, along with the impact of personal attributes of workers and 
industrial characteristics, on individual decision to unionise. The estimates suggest that a 
mixture of these factors determine an individual’s propensity to unionise.  
 
A notable result of this empirical work is that the reach of communist parties has significant 
effect on unionisation probability. The predicted probability of union membership of a ‘basic 
worker’
2 increases by 10% (6%) in mining (manufacturing) industry, in an otherwise 
identical situation, if communist parties’ support base increases from zero to a moderate or 
high level. Moreover, econometric analysis reveals that mere existence of communist parties 
might also influence individual decision to unionise to some extent. State-level political 
activism and unemployment rate also influence the individual decision significantly. Other 
than these factors, which assess the context of unionisation, worker’s gender, ethnic 
background, employment status, experience, occupation, sector of employment, 
establishment size, and type of industry significantly affect the probability that a worker will 
be a trade union member. Out of three industrial characteristics that we consider, sector of 
employment has the largest impact on individual decision: the predicted probability of a 
‘basic worker’ to join union increases by more than 42% if she moves from private sector to 
public sector, in an otherwise identical situation. Interestingly, high level of educational 
attainment, except technical degree and vocational training, does not seem to have adverse 
impact on individual’s propensity towards unionisation.  
 
We note that Martin and Brady (2007), which is a cross-country study on unionisation across 
39 less developed countries including India, is closely related to this paper. While Martin and 
Brady (2007) has assessed the role of communist regimes by categorising countries according 
to the nature of political institution: communist legacy or not, it completely neglects 
                                                 
2 See Section 5.1 for details.   5
variations across states within a country in terms of political and economic factors and fails to 
assess the role of political parties with different ideologies within a democracy. The present 
paper differs from Martin and Brady (2007) in several respects. First, it estimates the impact 
of the reach of communist parties and also of the degree of political activism at sub-national 
level, which is important particularly in Indian context since there is considerable variation 
across states in terms of the reach of communist parties and political activism. Second, it uses 
controls for variation across states in terms of labour market situation and standard of livings. 
Third, it estimates the impact of industrial characteristics, along with the impact of political 
factors and personal attributes, on individual’s propensity to unionise.    
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We begin in Section 2 by providing a brief 
description of political scenario and unionisation in India. Section 3 describes the data 
sources and the variables used. Section 4 outlines the estimation methodology. The results of 
estimation are presented in Section 5. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Political Scenario and Unionisation in India: 2004-05 
India, world’s largest liberal democracy with 28 states and seven union territories
3, has 
promoted a federal parliamentary multi-party representative democratic framework of 
politics. All 28 states, the union territory of Puducherry, and the national capital territory of 
Delhi  have elected governments, where politics is dominated by several national parties, 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), Communist Party of India (CPI), 
Communist Party of India–Marxist (CPM), Indian National Congress (INC) and Nationalist 
Congress Party (NCP), and various state-level political parties. Although political framework 
is same in all states, there is notable variation across states in terms of the functioning of state 
level political systems and political activism. In state legislative assembly elections held by 
2004, the range of voter turnout in the electoral process remained very high (46.51%), with 
the maximum at 90.21% in Manipur. Bihar scored the second lowest (45.85%), followed by 
Jammu & Kashmir (43.7%).
4 Such variation in political activism across states in India is a 
persistent phenomenon.
5  As expected in such scenarios, support base of political parties with 
different ideologies also vary widely across states. For example, communist parties, which 
are widely known for grass-root level organisations, mobilisation of the working class, 
                                                 
3 Out of seven union territories, Delhi is the national capital territory. 
4 Data source: Statistical Reports of General Election to the Legislative Assembly of various states, Election 
Commission of India, New Delhi.  
5 See (Besley and Burgess 2002), for variation in political activism across states in India during 1958-1992.   6
encouraging class-consciousness and facilitating trade unions, have very high support base in 
three states, namely Kerala, Tripura and West Bengal, but no support base at all in Arunachal 
Pradesh and Nagaland. Such variations in reach of communist parties, together with variation 
in political activism, across states likely to have significant consequences on industrial 
relations in general, and trade union memberships in particular.  
 
According to the central legislation of India, the Trade Unions (Amended) Act 2001
6, which 
is administered by concerned state governments, a registered trade union in India needs to 
have at least 10% or 100 of the workers as its members, subject to a minimum of seven 
persons engaged or employed in the establishment or industry.
7 Outsiders, i.e., non-
employees, can also be members of trade unions and serve as office-bearers.
8 There are 
multiple trade unions within establishment as well as large centralised unions. It is widely 
observed that political parties play crucial roles in formation of trade unions as well as in 
collective bargaining in India. Moreover, most of the trade union leaders, who are outsiders 
in many cases, are affiliated to political parties.  
 
In India, collective bargaining agreements apply to all workers covered by a particular 
agreement irrespective of their individual union status, as in all ‘open shop’ contexts.   
Guidelines for conflict resolution in the process of collective bargaining are provided by the 
central legislation, the Industrial Dispute Act 1947. However, state governments have full 
authority to amend this act. Most of the state governments have used this opportunity to 
strengthen or weaken various provisions of this act time to time (see Besley and Burgess 
2004), which were largely guided by political interests. As a result, there are wide variations 
in labour practices across states in India. The ‘state-dominated’ pluralism, along with 
ambiguous labour laws regarding many aspects of industrial relations, eventually led to a 
multiplicity of political party based trade unions in India (Bhattacherjee, 1999). 
 
                                                 
6 It is the amended Trade Union Act 1926, and is in effect from January 2002. 
7The rate of subscription by members of the trade union is also very low. ‘Minimum rate of subscription by 
members of the trade union is fixed at one rupee per annum for rural workers, three rupees per annum for 
workers in other unorganized sectors and 12 rupees per annum in all other cases. For the promotion of civil and 
political interest of its members unions are authorized to set up separate political funds.’ – Trade Unions 
(Amended) Act 2001.  
8 ‘All office bearers of a registered trade union, except not more than one-third of the total number of office 
bearers or five, whichever is less, shall be persons actually engaged or employed in the establishment or industry 
with which the trade union is connected.’ – Trade Unions (Amended) Act 2001.  
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Over all, in India, 34.13% of regular non-agricultural workers are trade union members. This 
percentage varies widely across states. In Mizoram it is as high as 91.28%, followed by 
74.51% in Tripura. On the other hand, it is less than 25% in states like Uttar Pradesh 




3. Data and Variables 
Data 
Our analysis is based on data from various sources. Data on individual attributes and 
industrial characteristics come from the 61
st round of the Employment and Unemployment 
Survey (EUS), carried out by the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO), Ministry of 
Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India, between July 2004 and June 
2005. The purpose of this survey was to provide estimates of various characteristics 
pertaining to employment and unemployment in India. EUS, based on a stratified multi-stage 
design, is the only nationally representative survey in India that collects information on 
individual trade union membership. In this analysis, we use a sub-sample of workers: non-
agricultural regular salaried/wage workers, based on usual principal activity status
10, in 27 
states (Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Jammu & Kashmir, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, 
Jharkhand, Assam, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, 
Andhra Pardesh, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, West Bengal, Mizoram, Goa, Haryana, 
Punjab, Maharastra, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala and Gujrat), union territory of Puducherry and 
the national capital territory of Delhi. That is, our sample covers all states and territories that 
have elected governments, except one state (Uttaranchal) for which required data on state-
level variables are not available.
11    
 
To measure political activism and the reach of communist parties we use data from the 
Statistical Reports of General Election to the Legislative Assembly of various states, Election 
Commission of India, New Delhi, India. Unfortunately, data on individual’s political 
affiliation is not available. Data on state-level unemployment rates comes from EUS.  The 
                                                 
9 Own calculations based on data from 2004-05 Employment and Unemployment Survey, NSSO, India.  
10 “The usual activity status relates to the activity status of a person during the reference period of 365 days 
preceding the date of survey. The activity status on which a person spent relatively longer time (i.e. major time 
criterion) during the 365 days preceding the date of survey is considered as the usual principal activity status of 
the person.” (NSSO 2006) 
 
11 States and territories of our sample covers about 99% of India’s population and employed workforce.    8
source of data on per capita Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) is the Central Statistical 
Organisation (CSO), Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of 
India, website as on 14-06-2008.  
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking value one if an individual is a trade 
union member, otherwise zero. We consider an individual to be a trade union member, if that 
individual responded positively to the question: “Are you a member of any union or 
association in your activity?”
12 Given the nature of this question, it seems to be logical to 
propose that unions represent collective organisations based on activities/trades of workers. 
Table 1 presents trade union membership in India during 2004-05. It is interesting to observe 
that union membership in states where communist parties have poor support base is much 
lower (by 11.48%) than that in states having moderate or high support base of communist 
parties. Descriptive statistics reveals that union membership in public sector is strikingly 
higher than that in private sector in India. It also indicates that union membership varies also 
across gender, occupation, establishment size, and industry. 
 
                                                 
12 It was asked conditionally following a positive response to the question: “Is there any union or association in 
your activity?” Note that it concerns to union in ‘activity/trade’; not in the ‘work place’ as in GHS or BHPS in 
Britain (Green 1990, Chrysanthou 2007). It seems to be reasonable to assume in the present context that 
individuals are likely to have freely exercised their preferences for their work activity. So, we choose to analyse 
individual union membership choice independently of whether or not there is a union in individual’s activity. 
Our results remain valid, if we estimate an appropriate conditional probit model (bivariate probit model), as in 




















The variables affecting the individual decision to unionise can be classified broadly into three 
categories, namely, state-level factors, personal attributes and industrial characteristics, as 
indicated in Table 2. Definitions of explanatory variables are detailed in Appendix 2. Table 3 
presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in this analysis.  
 
Table 2: Variables affecting the individual decision to unionise 
 
Individual-level variables  State-level variables 
Personal attributes  Industrial characteristics 
 





Political activism  Marital status  Sector – public or private 
Unemployment rate  Social-group   Type of industry 
Per capita NSDP  Religion   
 Education   
  Labour market experience   
 Employment  status   
 Occupation   
 
Table 1: Trade Union Membership in India, 2004-2005 
 
  Union Membership (Percent) 
Reach of communist parties    
  Communist vote –  Very Low or Low   32.81 
  Communist vote – Moderate or High   44.29 
Gender  
 Male  35.13 
 Female  30.07 
Occupation    
  Clerical and related worker  55.32 
  Administrator & manager   46.03 
  Professional and technical  52.37 
  Production and related worker  28.98 
 Other  manual  worker  25.70 
 Service  worker  20.93 
 Sales  worker  7.00 
Establishment Size   
  More than 20  55.63 
  Between 10 to 20  35.97 
 Less  than  10  17.90 
Sector  
 Public  sector  75.01 
 Private  sector  15.48 
Industry    
 Mining  78.87 
 Services  37.17 
 Manufacturing    23.26 
Overall 34.13   10
The individual-level data are linked to state-level measures of the reach of communist parties, 
political activism, labour market situation, and per capita net state domestic product (NSDP). 
We consider the percentage of votes polled in favour of communist parties’ candidates in 
state legislative assembly elections held by 2004 as a measure of the reach of communist 
parties across states
13, and use that as an explanatory variable. Since communist parties are 
widely known for their grass-root level organisations and active role in mobilising the 
working class in India, mere existence of communist parties in a state might also 
create/influence socio-political environment in favour of unionisation, irrespective of whether 
they have strong hold in a state or not. Need less to say, degree of strength of communist 
parties likely to have differential impact on individuals’ propensity to unionise.  In order to 
delineate such effects clearly, we categorise states according to the percentage of votes polled 
in favour of communist parties and use Communists’ Vote – Very Low, Communists’ Vote – Low, 
and Communists’ Vote – Moderate or High dummies in separate regression. See Appendix 2 for 
estimates of the reach of communist parties in various states in India. We use voter turnout as 
a measure of state-level political activism. It is expected that larger size of politically active 
population in a state will lead to higher union density. Another important factor is the labour 
market situation in a state, which is likely to have consequences on individual decision to 
unionise. Higher unemployment rate creates more uncertainty in job search and future 
earnings in case of layoff. Therefore, ‘insiders’ are likely to have higher propensity to 
unionise in sates with higher unemployment rate in order to protect their job. Hence, state-
level unemployment rate control is included in the union membership model. In order to 
control for possible effects of standard of living in a state, we use dummy variables, Per 
Capita NSDP – Medium and Per Capita NSDP – High, in the analysis.  
 
It is generally argued that females are less likely to unionise due to their discontinuous labour 
market participation. Descriptive statistics indicate that unionisation among female workers is 
less (by 5%) than their male counterpart in India (see Table 1). In fact, female participation in 
the labour market is also low in India: only about 20% of regular non-agricultural workers are 
female. Singles are also are expected to be less inclined to join union compared to married 
workers, due to their lower level of family commitments. In ‘exit voice’ scenario, individuals 
                                                 
13 Clearly, this measure is more appropriate and reliable compared to possible alternative measures based on 
political parties’ membership data. 
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with higher level of family commitments are likely to seek greater job security (Booth 1986). 
So, we include marital status variable in the analysis.   
 
Individuals from socially disadvantageous communities or minority-religion groups are 
expected to have a higher propensity to unionise in order to get protection against unfair 
discrimination. In India, socially disadvantageous communities are identified based on castes. 
These are scheduled castes (SC), scheduled tribes (ST), and other backward class (OBC). Out 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Variables   
 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min   Max 








Communist Vote (%)  6.951  14.135  0  49.18 
Communist Vote – Very Low   0.853  0.354  0  1 
Communist Vote – Low   0.031  0.172  0  1 








Voter Turnout (%)  66.225  7.732  43.70  90.21 
Unemployment Rate (per thousand)  32.385  32.160  7.54  166.50 
Per Capita NSDP – Medium    0.338  0.473  0  1 








Male 0.802  0.398  0  1 
Single 0.246  0.431  0  1 
Reserved Category – Scheduled  Castes and Tribes (SCST)   0.211  0.408  0  1 
Reserved Category –  Other Backward Class (OBC)  0.361  0.480  0  1 
Minority 0.165  0.371  0  1 
General Education – Middle   0.177  0.382  0  1 
General Education – Secondary  0.152  0.359  0  1 
General Education – Higher Secondary  0.162  0.368  0  1 
General Education – Graduate  0.159  0.366  0  1 
General Education – Post Graduate and above  0.061  0.240  0  1 
Technical Education – Diploma   0.066  0.249  0  1 
Technical Education – Graduate and above  0.047  0.211  0  1 
Vocational Training  0.072  0.258  0  1 
Work Experience  25.736  12.770  0  92 
Full-Time Employment  0.988  0.110  0  1 
Occupation – Professional and Technical  0.198  0.398  0  1 
Occupation – Clerical  0.170  0.375  0  1 
Occupation – Sales worker  0.093  0.291  0  1 
Occupation – Service worker  0.152  0.359  0  1 
Occupation – Production and related worker  0.353  0.478  0  1 








Establishment Size (0, 1, 2 categorical)  0.866  0.925  0  2 
Public Sector  0.313  0.464  0  1 
Industry – Mining   0.012  0.111  0  1 








Number of observations  33092   12
of these three groups, SC and ST are considered to be in more disadvantageous position 
compared to OBC. Government’s affirmative policies to uplift socio-economic condition of 
SC and ST communities also differ from that of OBC. So, we use two dummy variables, 
Scheduled Castes and Tribes (SCST) and Other Backward Class (OBC), in order to assess the 
impact of social-class. We also include Minority- religion variable in order to control for 
possible impact of being a member of minority-religion group. 
 
The level as well as the nature of education attained by an individual may also affect 
individual’s propensity towards unionisation. Educated workers may expect higher human 
capital premium through individual action compared to that in the unionised sector due to 
standardisation of wage rate via bargaining (Abowd and Farber, 1982). On the other hand, 
more educated workers may value collective action more due to their potential ability to 
influence union’s action (Booth, 1986). The EUS contains detailed information on each 
individual’s level of educational attainment as well as nature of education (general, technical, 
vocational), for which we use three sets of dummy variables.  
 
In order to asses the impact of individual’s labour market experience, we include the variable 
Work Experience and its square in the union membership model. Since there was no direct 
information on labour market experience in the EUS, we measure it by subtracting education 
leaving age from the present age of an individual. Though this measure might overestimate 
individuals’ labour market experience due to possible discontinuity in the labour market 
participation (Booth, 1986), this is the only alternative one can possibly consider in the 
present context. Employment status might also affect an individual’s propensity to unionise. 
It is argued that part-time workers are less inclined to unionise due to their less stable 
employment conditions and discontinuous participation in the labour force (Booth, 1986). We 
use Full-Time Employment dummy variable to assess the impact of employment status. We 
also use occupational dummies to control for impacts of occupational attributes. Based on 
National Occupational Classification (NCO) – 1968, we form six major occupational groups.  
 
Finally, to estimate the impact of industrial characteristics on individual decision to unionise, 
we include the categorical variable Establishment Size, sector specific dummy variable Public 
Sector, and industry specific dummy variables Mining and Manufacturing in the trade union 
membership model. It is generally argued that establishment size positively affects union 
density (see Hirsch and Addison, 1986 for a review). However, the positive relation between   13
establishment size and union density might get reversed, if large establishments act 
strategically, e.g., setting higher wages, to avoid unionisation (Brown and Medoff, 1989). 
Booth (1986) argues that establishment size and type of industry affects union membership 
via their impact on organisation costs. Such organisation cost is expected to decline with 
establishment size, labour immobility, and government recognition. Descriptive statistics 
shows that union membership increase from 17.9% in establishments with less than 10 
workers to 55.63% in establishments with more than 20 workers (see Table 1). Out of three 
groups of industries considered in this analysis, mining is found to be most heavily unionised 
industry, where more than 78% workers are member of trade union. Similar high rate of 
unionisation is also present in public sector establishments.  
 
4. Estimation Methodology 
The reduced form model depicting the individual decision to unionise or not can be written as 
follows.  
 
                          i i i u X Y + + = β α
/ * ,   i = 1, 2, …., N                           (1) 
                              ) 0 (
* > = i i Y I Y  











) (  
The net benefits of an individual i  from joining trade union are captured by the latent 
variable
*
i Y , and the union membership status of an individual i is indicated by the dummy 
variable i Y .   ) ( i u F  is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the error term  i u , which 
has logistic distribution.  i X  is the vector of exogenous explanatory variables (state-level 
variables, personal attributes and industrial characteristics), α  is the constant term, and β  is 
the vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. Clearly, the probability of an individual i 


















= = = . We estimate this model, using different set 
of explanatory variables as shown in Table 4, by maximum likelihood method with robust 
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We first estimate the above union membership model with Communists’ Vote(%) as an 
explanatory variable to examine the impact of communist parties on individual decision to 
unionise. Next, we drop this level variable and include Communists’ Vote – Very Low, 
Communists’ Vote – Low, and Communists’ Vote – Moderate or High dummies in order to examine 
whether mere existence of communist parties in a state also has any significant impact or not. It also 
helps us to tackle possible problem due to lopsided distribution of the level variable 
Communists’ Vote(%). Then, we include an additional control for state-level labour market situation, 
Unemployment Rate, and omit Other Backward Class (OBC) and Minority-religion because 
of their highly insignificant coefficients, in the final regression.
15 We find that the results 
obtained from alternative specifications of the model are very similar (see Table 4). Based on 
the results obtained from the final regression, as reported in the last two columns of Table 4, 
we calculate predicted probabilities of union membership for different categories of 
individuals under alternative scenario.  
 
We do not include individual’s wage in the union membership model, because in India 
collective bargaining agreements apply to all workers covered by a particular agreement 
irrespective of their individual union status, as in all ‘open shop’ contexts. Therefore, it seems 
that wage rate will not be an important variable in the present context, unlike as in ‘closed 
shop’ contexts. This is generally referred as ‘free rider’ problem in the literature associated 
with the trade union membership decision in ‘open shop’ contexts. Moreover, estimating a 
single equation model with wage rate as an explanatory variable might lead to the problem of 
endogeneity.
16  Nonetheless, we carry out a separate set of regression including individual’s 
earnings as an explanatory variable as in Booth (1986), see Appendix 1. We find that our 
main results go through, if we consider such alternative specification of the model. 
                                                 
14As indicated by the methodology of the survey (EUS), we have used sampling weights to compute descriptive 
statistics and to estimate the model.  
15High union density may contribute to unemployment rate, due to high bargained wage. However, that may 
lead to endogeneity problem, only if one attempts to estimate a model with union density as the dependent 
variable and unemployment rate as an explanatory variable. In the present context, the possibility of endogeneity 
problem is non existent; because an individual’s decision to join union at the margin will not alter union’s 
bargaining power and hence will not have any impact on variables like Unemployment Rate.  
16 Even if the relation between union status and wage rate is not simultaneous, the coefficient of wage rate may 
be biased because wage rate might capture effects of some omitted variables that are simultaneous (Booth 
1986). Estimation of an appropriate simultaneous equation model (SEM) might solve such problem, which is 
beyond the scope of this paper.    15
 
It is often argued that to asses the impact of contexts, it is appropriate to estimate a 
hierarchical model (see Luke 2004 and Raudenbush and Bryk 2002 for details). In order to 
check robustness of our results, we also estimate a hierarchical generalised linear logit model, 
as in Martin and Brady (2007), a particular specification of the commonly known generalised 
linear latent and mixed models (GLLAMM). We also estimate a conditional probit model to 
check whether our results change, if we estimate individual’s probability to join union 
conditional on union availability (as in Green, 1990). We report results of these two sets of 
estimates also in Appendix 1. These estimates confirm that our results are robust to 
alternative method of estimation.  
 
5. Results  
This section presents the estimates of the impact of state-level variables, personal attributes 
and industrial characteristics on individual’s propensity to unionise. Estimates of marginal 
effects are shown in Table 4, together with p-values.  
 
The econometric analysis shows that the reach of communist parties has positive and 
significant impact on individual’s propensity to unionise. Marginal effect of Communists’ Vote 
(%) is positive and significant. More interestingly, it also shows that existence of communist 
parties in a state positively affects the probability to unionise even if the support base of 
communist parties is low. Marginal effects of both Communist Vote – Very Low and 
Communist Vote – Low are also positive and significant. It indicates that mere existence of 
communist parties in a state also seems to be effective in facilitating trade unions to some 
extent. We also find that the unionisation probability increases with an increase in state-level 
political activism, marginal effect of the variable Voter Turnout is positive and significant. It 
demonstrates that the degree of political activism plays important role in influencing 
individual decision to unionise. These are notable findings of this paper.  
 
We find that, other than political factors, labour market situation in a state also plays 
important role in shaping the context of unionisation. Table 4 shows that marginal effect of 
Unemployment Rate is positive and significant. It supports the hypothesis that higher 
unemployment rate leads to higher level of uncertainty of future earnings and that in turn 
makes an individual more inclined towards unionisation to protect his or her job.  
   16
Now consider the personal attributes of individuals. The estimated marginal effect of Work 
Experience variable is positive and significant, but its square term has negative effect. It 
implies that individual’s propensity towards unionisation increases, at a decreasing rate, with 
his or her work experience. It seems that individuals at their old age appreciate the value of 
union more and hence are more inclined towards unionisation than relatively young 
individuals.
17 Similar effect is also present in case of individuals with more family 
commitments (marginal effect of the dummy Single is negative and significant).  This result 
is in sharp contrast to the findings of Booth (1986) in case of Britain. Table 4 also shows that 
gender, captured by Male dummy, and employment status, captured by Full-Time 
Employment dummy, have significant impact on individual’s decision to unionise. It supports 
the commonly held view that discontinuous participation in the labour force and less stable 
employment conditions induce an individual to be less inclined towards unionisation. Lower 
probability for females to join union might also be due to less number of females in activity 
or work place; only 20% of the regular non-agricultural workers are females in India. Social 
norms and customs might also discourage females from being union member. Ethnic 
background and occupation also influence individual’s propensity to unionise. We find that 
marginal effect of the dummy SCST is positive and significant; but, OBC and Minority-
religion dummies are not significant. Relatively more disadvantageous background of SCs 
and STs, compared to OBCs, in India seems to have propelled them to get more united in 
order to protect themselves from labour market discriminations. It also indicates that, in 
India, as far as trade union membership is concerned, the degree of backwardness of 
individual’s social-group matters, not his or her religion. Further, we find that level of general 
education, which is non-technical, has positive and significant effect on individual decision to 
unionise.  Technical diploma holders are also seems to appreciate the value of union more 
than individuals who do not have any technical education. Only technical degree and 
vocational training has negative, but insignificant, impact on individual’s propensity to 
unionise. It implies that both the level and the type of education together influence individual 
decision to unionise. Note that in case of Britain education is found to have no impact on 
individual’s propensity to unionise (Booth, 1986). Therefore, the argument that individual’s 
with higher level of educational attainment are likely to value trade unions less seems to be 
inapt in case of India. Rather this finding provides some support to the argument that more 
                                                 
17 We note that Gani (1996) also analyses effects of personal attributes on individual decision to unionise using 
data from India and finds similar result. However, that analysis is based on a very narrow data set collected from 
five selective firms and focus only on individual characteristics, no attempt has been made to assess the context 
of unionisation and impact of industrial characteristics.   17
educated individuals might appreciate the value of union more because of their potential 
ability to influence union’s functioning.  
 
Table 4:  Logit Analysis of Trade Union Membership in India 
 
(1) (2) (3)   
Independent Variables  M. E.  p values  M. E.  p values  M. E.  p values 
 
State–level  factors 
       
Communists’ Vote (%)  0.0020  0.000         
Communists’ Vote, dummy (Ref: Nil )             
Very Low       0.0756  0.006  0.0873  0.001 
 Low      0.2773  0.000  0.2869  0.000 
 
 Moderate or High      0.1747  0.000  0.1026  0.013 
Voter Turnout (%)  0.0023  0.012  0.0035  0.000  0.0032  0.001 
Unemployment  Rate  (per  thousand)       0.0011  0.000 
Per Capita NSDP, dummy (Ref: Low)              
Medium  0.0132 0.354 0.0265 0.073 0.0437 0.004   
High  0.0230 0.098 0.0360 0.014 0.0226 0.128 
 
Personal attributes 
      
Male,  dummy  0.0487 0.000 0.0497 0.000  0.0553  0.000 
Single,  dummy  -0.0688 0.000 -0.0694 0.000  -0.0722  0.000 
Reserved Category, dummy (Ref: General)             
Scheduled Castes and Tribes (SCST)  0.0395 0.005 0.0374 0.008 0.0387 0.002   
Other Backward Class (OBC)  0.0048 0.696 0.0003 0.983     
Minority-religion, dummy (Ref: Hindu)  0.0007  0.959  0.0005  0.972     
General Education, dummy (Ref: Below Middle)             
Middle  0.1081 0.000 0.1061 0.000 0.1032 0.000 
Secondary 0.1102  0.000  0.1054 0.000 0.1008 0.000 
Higher Secondary  0.1741  0.000  0.1733 0.000 0.1720 0.000 
Graduate 0.2342  0.000  0.2310 0.000 0.2287 0.000 
 
Post Graduate and Above  0.2287  0.000  0.2285 0.000 0.2241 0.000 
Technical  Education,  dummy  (Ref:  Nil)        
Diploma  0.0850 0.001 0.0814 0.001 0.0730 0.003   
Graduate and Above  -0.0015  0.954 -0.0035 0.891 -0.0057 0.824 
Vocational Training, dummy  -0.0214 0.419 -0.0204 0.442 -0.0213 0.425 
Work Experience (Yrs.)  0.0194 0.000 0.0193 0.000 0.0192 0.000 
Square of Work Experience  -0.0002 0.000 -0.0002 0.000 -0.0002 0.000 
Full-Time Employment, dummy  0.1648 0.000 0.1648 0.000 0.1623 0.000 
Occupation,  dummy(Ref  :Administrator  &  Manager)        
Professional and Technical  0.1542 0.000 0.1575 0.000 0.1614 0.000 
Clerical  0.1134 0.000 0.1193 0.002 0.1208 0.002 
Sales worker  -0.0410  0.269 -0.0383 0.294 -0.0374 0.309 
Service  worker  -0.0620 0.056 -0.0582 0.068 -0.0569 0.077 
Production and related worker  0.1094 0.003 0.1121 0.002 0.1129 0.002 
 
Other manual worker  -0.0479  0.562 -0.0468 0.575 -0.0500 0.538 
Industrial characteristics        
Establishment Size (0, 1, 2 categorical)  0.1134 0.000 0.1131 0.000 0.1137 0.000 
Public Sector, dummy  0.4647 0.000 0.4664 0.000 0.4672 0.000 
Industry,  dummy  (Ref:  Service)        
Mining  0.2208 0.002 0.2155 0.000 0.2171 0.002   
Manufacturing 0.0066  0.672 0.0092 0.560 0.0138 0.382 
Number of observations  33090 33090 33092 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -13433.149 -13399.325 -13369.913 
 
Overall significance 
2 χ (30)=3415.45,     
Prob >
2 χ = 0.00 
2 χ (32)=3466.91,     
Prob >
2 χ = 0.00 
2 χ ( 31 )= 3433.96,  
Prob  >
2 χ = 0.000 
Pseudo R-square  0.3676 0.3691 0.3706   18
Finally, we also find that the occupation of an individual plays some role in his or her 
decision to unionise. Table 4 indicates that production and related workers, clerks, 
professionals and technicians are more probable, and service workers are less probable to join 
union compared to administrators and managers. Therefore, it seems that there is no clear 
distinction between ‘blue collar’ and ‘white collar’ workers in terms of their propensity to 
join activity-based unions in India. 
 
Considering industrial characteristics, we find that the establishment size has positive and 
significant impact on individual’s decision to unionise. It supports the view that the larger 
establishments offer greater scope for unionisation due to more peer pressure to unionise 
and/or possible higher market power leading to higher rents to be bargained over. In effect, 
this finding refutes the view that larger establishments avoid unionisation by setting 
strategically higher wages. We also find that the Public Sector dummy has very high and 
significant marginal effect. It supports commonly held view that public sector workers are 
more likely to unionise compared to private sector workers. Out of three broad types of 
industry, services, mining, and manufacturing, we find that, individuals are most likely to join 
union in mining industry.  
 
5.1 Predicted Probabilities 
To illustrate the size of the effects of some of the factors as discussed above, we present the 
predicted probabilities of union membership for an arbitrarily defined archetypical ‘basic 
worker’ in Table 5. This basic worker is a full-time general-category Hindu married female, 
with five years work-experience, employed in private sector as a production and related 
worker. She is a graduate of general stream and does not have any technical or vocational 
training. There are more than 20 workers in her workplace. She lives in a state in which per 
capita NSDP is at medium level, unemployment rate and electoral turnout are at national 
average level, and communist parties do not have any support base. Each row of Table 5 
corresponds to the predicted probability that derives from altering one of the characteristics 
of basic worker. Predicted probabilities of a basic worker in manufacturing industry and 
mining industry are presented in separate columns.    
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Table 5:  Predicted Probabilities (Percent) of Union Membership 
 
  Manufacturing Mining 








Basic  11.68  24.21  
Communists’ Vote (Moderate or High)  17.72  6.04  34.22  10.01 
Male  15.11 3.43 30.06 5.86 
SCST  13.83 2.15 27.94 3.73 
Public  Sector  54.48 42.80 74.29 50.09 
20  Years  Experience  27.79 16.11 48.16 23.96 
 
With all other characteristics held constant, if we change the basic worker’s state from, say, 
Arunachal Pradesh (no vote for communists) to West Bengal (high support base of 
communist parties), her predicted probability of being unionist  increases from 11.68% to 
17.72% (manufacturing industry) or from 24.21% to 34.22% (mining industry). Therefore, 
the reach of communist parties has sizeable predicted effect. Compared to it, the predicted 
effect of being male or belonging to scheduled castes or scheduled tribes category is quite 
small in both manufacturing and mining industries. More dramatic is the rise in individual’s 
propensity to unionise deriving from being in public sector or being more experienced. If a 
basic worker’s experience increases from 5 years to 15 years, with all other characteristics 
held constant, her probability of being unionist increases by 16.11% (manufacturing industry) 
or 23.96% (mining industry). If we change the basic worker’s sector of employment from 
private to public, the probability to unionise increases by 42.80% (manufacturing industry) or 
50.09% (mining industry) in an otherwise identical situation.  
 
Table 6:  Stage-by-Stage Changes in Predicted Probabilities (Percent)  
 
  Manufacturing Mining 








Basic  11.68  24.21  
Communists’ Vote (Moderate or High)  17.72  6.04  34.22  10.01 
Communists’ Vote (Moderate or High) / 
Public Sector 
66.09 54.41 82.48 58.27 
Communists’ Vote (Moderate or High)  / 
Public Sector /  20 Years Experience 
85.01 73.33 93.19 68.99 
Communists’ Vote (Moderate or High) / 
Public Sector /  20 Years Experience / 
SCST 
87.32 75.63 94.33 70.12 
Communists’ Vote (Moderate or High) / 
Public Sector / 20 Years Experience / 
SCST / Male 
90.26 78.58 95.72 71.52 
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To illustrate further, the basic worker is now to be transformed incrementally into a worker 
who lives in a state in which communist parties have moderate or high support base, works in 
public sector, has 20 years of experience and belongs to scheduled castes or scheduled tribe 
category, and is male, all other characteristics held constant. This transformation alters the 
probability of being unionist, as shown in Table 6. Note that the completely transformed 
basic worker’s probability to join union is more than 90%.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper provides estimates of the impact of political factors, along with the impact of 
personal attributes and industrial characteristics, on individual decision to unionise in India 
using the representative survey data. Contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it quantifies 
the effects of the reach of communist parties and the degree of political activism at sub-
national level on individual’s decision to unionise.  Second, it provides empirical evidence of 
individual’s propensity towards unionisation in a developing country using a representative 
data set.   
 
We find that the reach of communist parties has sizeable predicted effect on individual’s 
propensity to unionise. Further, we find that it is not necessary to have large support base, 
mere existence of communist parties in a state also facilitates unionisation significantly.  We 
also find that both political activism and unemployment rate have positive and significant 
impact on individual’s propensity to be unionist. 
 
Econometric analysis reveals that full-time male worker’s probability to join union is higher 
than part-time and/or female workers. It indicates that increasing casualisation of workforce 
in India in the post-liberalisation period (Bhaumik, 2003) seems to have adverse impact on 
unionisation.
18 This paper documents that individuals from scheduled castes or scheduled 
tribe categories are more inclined to unions compared to general category individuals. 
However, minority religion and other backward castes were found to have no relationship to 
the unionisation probability. It indicates that the differential affirmative policy together with 
the degree of social backwardness might have contributed to some extent in shaping 
individual decision to unionise. Econometric analysis also indicates that individual’s 
propensity to unionise increases considerably at the verge of his or her retirement, which 
                                                 
18 Union membership has declined by 12% in India during 1987 to 2001. (Source: various issues of Indian 
Labour Statistics, Labour Bureau, Shimla.)    21
might have some implications to social security policies in India.  We also find that, except 
technical degree and vocational training, individual’s educational attainment positively 
affects his or her probability to be unionist. Occupation of individual and industrial 
characteristics also play important role in influencing individual decision to unionise. Very 
high impact of public sector on the probability of union membership seems to indicate that 
the nature of workplace environment plays very crucial role in facilitating trade unions. 
 
It might be more appropriate to study individual decision to unionise in a dynamic context, 
since cross-section estimates may be biased due to unobservable individual specific effects. 
That will also help to understand the relation between changes in the pattern of trade union 
membership and changes in political factors and macroeconomic policies over time. 
Unfortunately, required data for such analysis in Indian context is not available. Nonetheless, 
this paper provides some new insights to understand the issue of trade union membership, 
particularly in the context of developing countries like India, and can possibly be considered 
as a base paper for future research that aims to analyse trade union membership at sub-






















Appendix 1:  Robustness Analysis 
 
   Conditional Probit  GLLAMM  Logit analysis including 
Earnings 
Independent Variables  Coeff.  p values  Coeff.  p values  Coeff.  p values 
State–level  factors                   
Communists’ Vote, dummy (Ref: Nil )                  
Very Low   0.1955  0.029  0.5095  0.000  0.5945  0.000 
 Low  0.6340  0.000  1.1549  0.000  1.2653  0.000 
  
 Moderate or High  0.1949  0.051  0.6568  0.000  0.5606  0.004 
Voter Turnout (%)  0.0089  0.001  0.0109  0.000  0.0195  0.000 
Unemployment Rate (per thousand)  0.0036  0.000  0.0065  0.000  0.0059  0.000 
Per Capita NSDP, dummy (Ref: Low)                  
Medium 0.1240  0.003  0.2013  0.005  0.1834  0.021    
High 0.0613  0.140  0.1053  0.067  0.0579  0.455 
Personal attributes                 
Earnings            0.0003  0.000 
Male, dummy  0.2261  0.000  0.3024  0.000  0.1975  0.004 
Single, dummy  -0.1586  0.000  -0.3935  0.000  -0.4115  0.000 
Reserved Category, dummy (Ref: General)                 
   Scheduled Castes and Tribes (SCST) 0.0235  0.116  0.1960  0.002 0.2272  0.000 
General Education, dummy (Ref: Below 
Middle) 
               
Middle 0.0313  0.259  0.4548  0.000  0.4280  0.000 
Secondary 0.0877  0.000  0.4695  0.000  0.3694  0.000 
Higher Secondary  0.0828  0.006  0.7795  0.000  0.6529  0.000 
Graduate 0.1169  0.000  1.0557  0.000  0.7660  0.000 
  
Post Graduate and Above  0.1066 0.005  1.1031  0.000  0.6365  0.000 
Technical Education, dummy (Ref: Nil)                 
Diploma 0.0146  0.632  0.2118  0.061  0.2335  0.044    
Graduate and Above  -0.0051  0.889  -0.0238  0.878  -0.3571  0.023 
Vocational Training, dummy  -0.0988  0.118  -0.1421  0.206  -0.0389  0.784 
Work Experience (Yrs.)  0.0127  0.000  0.1010  0.000  0.0821  0.000 
Square of Work Experience  -0.0002  0.003  -0.0011  0.000  -0.0009  0.000 
Full-Time Employment, dummy  0.6353  0.000  1.1497  0.000  0.9606  0.004 
Occupation, dummy(Ref :Administrator & 
Manager) 
               
Professional and Technical  0.3046  0.001  0.7425  0.000  1.2830  0.000 
Clerical 0.1981  0.038  0.5823    1.1673  0.000 
Sales worker  -0.2928  0.006  -0.1710  0.466  0.3542  0.170 
Service worker  -0.3433  0.001  -0.2919  0.075  0.3285  0.179 
Production and related worker  0.1102  0.254  0.6074  0.000  1.1770  0.000 
  
Other manual worker  -0.3454  0.231  -0.0946  0.789  0.3808  0.449 
Industrial characteristics                 
Establishment Size (0, 1, 2 categorical)  0.3701  0.000  0.6051  0.000  0.5242  0.000 
Public Sector, dummy  1.4490  0.000  2.2202  0.000  2.1166  0.000 
Industry, dummy (Ref: Service)                 
Mining 0.5077  0.001  0.8282  0.023  0.8317  0.005    
Manufacturing 0.0028  0.950  0.0983  0.245  0.0688  0.397 
Constant  -3.4230 0.000  -7.7609  0.000  -8.4252  0.000 
   No. of  obs. 33092  No. of  Level 1 units 33092,  No.  
of Level 2 units 29 
No. of obs. 32120.           
Pseudo R-square = 0.3706 
   Log pseudolikelihood     
= -26805376 
     Log likelihood               
= -18146849 
    Log pseudo-likelihood      
= -12794.074  
Overall significance  Prob > chi2 = 0.000  Prob > chi2 =    0.000  Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
Notes: (1) In conditional probit model NSDP dummies, dummies for communists’ vote, Voter Turnout, Unemployment Rate, 
Full-Time Employment, Male, occupation dummies, Establishment Size, Public Sector, and industry dummies have been 
used to estimate the union-existence equation. (2) In GLLAMM model, we consider personal attributes and industrial 
characteristics as level-1 variables, and state-level variables as level-2 variables. We consider that level-2 variables affect the 
individual decision to unionise directly, as in Martin and Brady (2007). (3) The variable Earnings  is defined as the 
individual’s wage or salary earnings per week. Estimation of logit model including the Earnings variable suffers from the 
endogeneity problem.  
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State-level factors   
Communists’ Vote (%)  (Percentage of Communists’ Votes)=100*(Number of votes polled in favour of  
candidates affiliated to communist parties in a State/UT in the state legislative 
election held by 2004)/(Total number of  valid votes polled  in that election) 
  
Based on agenda papers of parties and manifestoes released before the election, 
we have considered CPI, CPM, CPIML, FBL, RSP, RPI, RCPI, PDS, AIFB, 
KECB, and DRPP as communist/leftist political parties, and others as non-
communist parties.  
 
Communists’ Vote  
(Ref:  Nil) 
–  Very Low 
 
The variable Communists’ Vote – Very Low takes value 1, if the percentage of 
communists’ votes in a State/UT is greater than zero but less than 5; otherwise it 
takes value zero. In the following states communists’ vote was less than 5%. 
Mizoram (0.03%), Meghalaya (0.06%), Sikkim (0.07%), Gujrat (0.2%), Delhi 
(0.24%), Goa (0.27%), Haryana 0.3%), Uttar Pradesh (0.56%), Karnataka 
(0.61%), Madhya Pradesh (0.67%), Himachal Pradesh (0.68%), Rajasthan 
(0.99%), Jammu & Kashmir (1.04%), Maharastra (1.49%), Chhattisgarh 
(1.51%), Orissa (1.8%), Punjab (2.55%), Assam (3.21%), Andhra Pardesh 
(3.56%), and Tamil Nadu (4.6%). 
 
–  Low 
 
The variable Communists’ Vote – Low takes value 1, if the percentage of 
communists’ votes in a State/UT is greater than or equal to 5 but less than 10; 
otherwise it takes value zero. In the following states communists’ vote was 
between 5% to 10%. Puducherry (5.09%), Bihar (5.21%), Manipur (8.36%), and 
Jharkhand (8.31%). 
–  Moderate or High 
 
The variable Communists’ Vote – Moderate or High takes value 1, if the 
percentage of communists’ votes in a State/UT is greater than 10; otherwise it 
takes value zero. In fact, in none of the states communists’ vote was greater than 
10% but less than 40%. Communist parties got more that 40% in each of the 
three states, which belong to this category, Kerala (40.6%), West Bengal 
(48.7%), and Tripura (49.18%).  
 
In Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland communists’ vote was 0%, which 
constitutes the base category. 
 
Source: Statistical Reports of General Election to the Legislative Assembly of 
various States/Union Territories, Election Commission of India, New Delhi.  
 
Voter Turnout (%)  Percentage of total votes polled in a State/UT in the legislative election held by 
2004. 
  
Source: Statistical Reports of General Election to the Legislative Assembly of 
various States/Union Territories, Election Commission of India, New Delhi 
 
Unemployment Rate  
(per thousand) 
Number of individual unemployed per 1000 individuals in the labour force, 
according to usual principal activity status, in a State/UT. (Source: EUS) 
Per Capita NSDP  
–  Medium 
 
 
The variable Per Capita NSDP – Medium takes value 1, if per capita NSDP at 
factor cost at constant prices (base: 1999-2000) in a State/UT is more than Rs. 
18147 but less than or equal to Rs. 22835 (i.e., between 40 to 70 percentile); 0   24
otherwise.  In Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pardesh, Tripura, Arunachal 
Pradesh, Sikkim, West Bengal and Mizoram per capita NSDP was medium. 
 
–  High 
 
The variable Per Capita NSDP – High takes value 1, if per capita NSDP in a 
State/UT is more than Rs. 22835 (i.e., above 70 percentile); 0 otherwise. Delhi, 
Goa, Puducherry, Haryana, Punjab, Maharastra, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala and 
Gujrat belong to the category of high per capita NSDP. 
 
Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Jammu & Kashmir, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, 
Jharkhand, Assam, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar belong to 
the category of low (i.e., below 40 percentile) per capita NSDP. 
 
Source: Central Statistical Organisation (CSO), India, website as on 14-06-2008. 
 
Individual attributes   
Male  It takes value 1, if the individual is male; otherwise zero. (Source: EUS) 
 
Single  It takes value 1, if the individual is not married; otherwise zero. (Source: EUS) 
 
Reserved Category 
–  Scheduled Castes 
and 
Tribes (SCST)         
 
 
It takes value 1, if the individual belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe 
category, otherwise zero.   
 
–  Other Backward 
Class (OBC) 
It takes value 1, if the individual belongs to Other Backward Class category; 





It takes value 1, if the individual’s religion is not Hindu; otherwise zero. (Source: 
EUS) 
 
General Education  
(Ref: Below Middle) 




It takes value 1, if the individual’s highest education (general stream) is of 
middle standard; otherwise zero.  
 
–  Secondary   
 
It takes value 1, if the individual’s highest education (general stream) is of 
secondary standard; otherwise zero.  
–  Higher Secondary   It takes value 1, if the individual’s highest education (general stream) is of higher 
secondary standard; otherwise zero.  
–  Graduate   
 
It takes value 1, if the individual’s highest education (general stream) is of 
graduation standard; otherwise zero.  
 
–  Post Graduate and 
above 
 
It takes value 1, if the individual is highest education (general stream) is of post-
graduation standard or above; otherwise zero. (Source: EUS) 
 
Technical Education  
(Ref: Nil) 




It takes value 1, if the individual has a Diploma in technical education; otherwise 
zero.  
 
–  Graduate and 
above 
It takes value 1, if the individual has a Graduate or above degree in technical 
education; otherwise zero (Source: EUS)   25
   




Work Experience (Yrs.)  Individual’s number of years in the labour market. It is calculated as (Actual age 
of the individual minus his or her education leaving age). (Source: EUS) 
 
 




Occupation (Ref:  
Administrator & Manager) 
Administrative, Executive & Managerial category (NCO-68 1-digit: 2) is the 
reference.  
 
–  Professional and 
Technical 
 
It takes value 1, if the individual’s occupation falls in the category of 
Professional, Technical and Related Workers (NCO-68 1-digit: 0 and 1); 
otherwise zero. 
 
–  Clerical 
 
It takes value 1, if the individual’s occupation falls in the category of Clerical 
and Related Workers (NCO-68 1-digit: 3); otherwise zero. 
 
–  Sales worker  It takes value 1, if the individual is a Sales Worker (NCO-68 1-digit: 4); 
otherwise zero. 
–  Service worker 
 
It takes value 1, if the individual is a Service Worker (NCO-68 1-digit: 5); 
otherwise zero. 
 
–  Production and 
related worker 
 
It takes value 1, if the individual’s occupation falls in the category of Operators 
& Labourers (NCO-68 1-digit: 7, 8, and 9); otherwise zero. 
 
–  Other manual 
worker 
 
It takes value 1, if the individual’s occupation does not belong to any of the 
above categories (NCO-68 1-digit: 6); otherwise zero. (Source: EUS) 
 
Industrial Characteristics   
Establishment Size  
(0, 1, 2 categorical) 
Establishment Size is zero, if the number of workers in the 
establishment/enterprise is less than 10. 
Establishment Size is 1, if the number of workers in the establishment/enterprise 
is 10 and above but less than 20. 
Establishment Size is 2, if the number of workers in the establishment/enterprise 
is 20 and above. (Source: EUS) 
 
Public Sector  It takes value 1, if the individual works in a public sector enterprise; otherwise 
zero. (Source: EUS) 
 
Industry (Ref: Service)  Service industry (NIC-98 2-digit codes: 40 to 99) is the base category. 
 
–  Mining 
 
It takes value 1, if the individual works in mining industry (NIC-98 2-digit 
codes: 10 to 14); otherwise zero. 
 
–  Manufacturing 
 
It takes value 1, if the individual works in manufacturing industry (NIC-98 2-
digit codes: 15 to 37); otherwise zero. (Source: EUS) 
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